Introduction
It is well-known that discourse relations (henceforth DRs) and discourse markers (henceforth DMs) have the apparent ability to relate different types of semantic objects. For instance, (1a) s eems to exploit a relation between propositions and (1b) a relation between a proposition and a speech act.
1a.
I'm late, (so) I'll take a taxi 1b.
I'm late, (so) can you call a taxi
In this paper, we show that this conception is intuitively co rrect but needs some refinement to be applied to more fine -grained phenomena in French. In section 2, we address the problem of epistemic states as possible terms of consequence/cause relations. In essence, we propose a richer ontology in which inference rules play a central role. In section 3, we consider the case of parce que (because) in relation with the speech act level.
Epistemic states and consequence DMs

The standard approach
It is generally assumed in the literature that DRs can be anchored a t different discourse levels: the content level, the epistemic level and the speech act level, as illustrated by the following three examples.
2a.
Jean est arrivé en retard. Il a raté son train (content) John was late. He missed his train 2b.
Jean doit avoir eu un accident. Il a le bras dans le plâtre (epistemic) John must have had an accident. His arm has been plastered 2c.
Depuis trois semaines Marie ne vient plus au séminaire. Est -ce qu'elle est malade ? (speech act) Mary has not attended the course for three weeks. Is she ill
DMs too can exploit those 3 levels or domains (Sweetser 1990 ).
3a.
Jean est arrivé en retard. Donc il a raté son train John was late. So he missed his train 3b.
Jean doit avoir eu un accident, parce qu'il a le bras dans le plâtre John must have had an accident, because he has a plastered arm 3c.
Depuis trois semaines Marie ne vient plus au séminaire. Donc est -ce qu'elle est malade ? Mary has not attended the course for three weeks. So, is she ill This is not surprising. The two DRs EXPLANATION and CONSEQUENCE can hold between entities of the sort denoted by abstract classifiers such as proposition, fact or event (see Vendler 1967 and Asher 1993 for discussion); for simplicity, we will use the generic term of content, ignoring the differences between these three subclasses and many others ( possibilities, tropes, etc.) . For example, a fact can be a consequence of another fact. They can also hold between epistemic states. While contents purport refer to 'objective' states of affairs, that
is, describe what is the case, epistemic states describe beliefs or, more generally, opinions (for instance deontic judgme nts) of the speaker. Note that, in principle, the possibility that the same sentence refer to a content, for instance a fact f, and an epistemic state, the belief that f, is not excluded. Finally, a speech act can be explained by an epistemic state or be a consequence of it. Connections between speech acts and other semantic objects are crucial in models which rely on some form of planning to account for some conversational or discourse moves (see Asher & Lascarides 1998 for a recent perspective).
The problem of epistemic modals
Like must in English or muβ β β β in German (Kratzer 1981) , the verb devoir in French may signal that the speaker does not report a fact but rather the consequence of a personal inference. In (4), the speaker indicates that John having had an accident is not necessarily a real event, but rather the result of an inference from the fact that John has a plastered arm.
4.
Jean a le bras dans le plâtre ; il doit avoir eu un accident John has a plastered arm ; he must have had an accident
Starting from this property of devoir, we can make a number of observations or natural assumptions which, taken together, lead one to make the connection between DMs and epistemic discourse level more precise.
• • • • ASSUMPTION 1 (type-driven discourse level sensitivity). The different levels of discourse reflect the types of the entities which are linked by a DR or a DM. In particular, the epistemic level corresponds to a link involving at least one epistemic state.
• • • • OBSERVATION 1. In French, some consequence DMs cannot connect a fact and one of its possible explanations (Rossari & Jayez 1996) . For instance (5b) is quite strange.
5a
. Jean a le bras dans le plâtre ; donc/alors il a eu un accident John has a plastered arm ; therefore/so he had an accident 5b.
Jean a le bras dans le plâtre ; is because the speaker knows that John has a plastered arm that she believes that
John must have had an accident. We have to explain how de ce fait and du coup, which accept only causal relations, do not "see" abductive relations as c ausal at the level of epistemic states.
Rules and discourse level
We can maintain the set of assumptions presented in the previous section if we clarify the discourse level sensitivity of consequence DMs. We propose that it is a reflection of a more basic sensitivity to the type of inference rules, which are used to substantiate the consequence connection. Some DMs, which seem to select the types of the entities they connect (content vs epistemic state) actually select types of rules.
In (Jayez & Rossari 1998) , we proposed an account of consequence DMs in which the dynamics of discourse and the inference rules can be combined. The adoption of a dynamic perspective was motivated by problems with non assertive speech acts (mainly imperatives). For space reasons, we will not recapitulate this analysis here; however, we will take care to couch the present proposal in dynamic terms to ensure compatibility with our general framework. In addition to the treatment of non-assertive speech acts, another advantage of using a dynamic approach is that various notions of information states can be defined and compared in this framework in a natural and flexible way (see for instance Groeneveld 1995 and Gerbrandy 1998) .
Following the majority of recent frameworks (Fauconnier's (1984 (Fauconnier's ( , 1997 ) mental spaces, DRT (Kamp & Reyle 1993) , SDRT (Asher 1993 ) and dynamic semantics (Stalnaker 1978 , Heim 1982 , Veltman 1996 , we assume that discourse units (sentences in our examples) correspond to moves in an information space, rather than just static descriptions of states of affairs. Specifically, we consider the contribution of an assertive sentence to be an update, in Stalnaker's (1978) or Veltman's (1996) Note that the definition is co nditional; it does not require that there be any actual update but only that a certain sequence of possible updates be successful. Rule sets are not in general so simple as this. They can have internal structure (rule hierarchy, defaults, etc.) and give rise to complex interactions (see Pollock 1995) .
Ignoring such details, we just assume for the moment that they are sets of typed premise(s)-conclusion pairs, of the form φ 1 … φ n ⇒ CAUSE ψ or φ 1 … φ n ⇒ ABD ψ. The label CAUSE/ABD indicates the type of the rule, causal or abductive.
Returning to consequence DMs, we propose that they are sensitive to the type of the rule(s) on which they ground the dynamic connection. Donc and alors accept causal and abductive rules, while de ce fait and du coup accept only causal rules.
Does this follow from the semantic properties of fait (fact)? It has been noted in the relevant literature (Vendler 1967 , Asher 1993 , Jayez & Godard 1999 , that the words fait and fact refer to the world "as it is". To this extent, one might propose that relations involving facts are not constructed by cognitive agents, but only observed by them. This would be the reason wh fait and fact resist abductive inference, which relies on perspectives.
12.
Le fait qu'il a le bras dans le plâtre ??
entraîne le fait qu'il a eu un accident The fact that he has a plastered arm ?? causes the fact that he had an accident Since the word coup denotes a factual event (something which is the case and is an event, not a state), it would also resist abdu ctive inference. However there are reasons not to adopt this hypothesis. First, there are modal facts.
13.
Le fait que Jean a dû rater son train nous incite a retarder la réunion The fact that John must have missed his train invites us to dela the meetin So, facts are not entirely alien to the perspectives of agents. Second, the example (12) is misleading. The verb entraîner has a strong causal flavour which is in itself incompatible with abduction. If we replace it with impliquer (to entail), the incompatibility with abduction disappears.
14.
Le fait que Jean a le bras dans le plâtre implique qu'il a eu/a dû avoir un accident The fact that John has a plastered arm entails that he had/must have had an accident So, whatever the influence of fait and coup might be, the observed constraint is not a simple reflection of the lexical meaning of the noun occurring in those two DMs.
We noted that de ce fait and du coup can introduce sentences with devoir, which do not describe states of affa irs, as evidenced by their incompatibility with à cause de (9a,b). We must streamline our constraints in order to allow de ce fait and du coup to use causal rules without turning them into causation markers which connect only contents
Rules and perspectives
The Stalnaker/Veltmann notion of information state does not allow one to make a clear difference between states of affairs in the world and epistemic states, since, in a sense, everything is epistemic in such models. Our first task is to enrich the notion of information state.
15.
Information states of an agent
Let Σ be a set of propositions, and I a set of atoms, a perspective π on Σ is a pair <i,Σ>, where i ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ I. i is called the viewpoint of the perspective. The meaning of this definition is that the distinction between cause and abduction pertains to the realm of contents. Note that, in contrast to a causal rule, the conclusion of an abductive rule i s always modal. This reflects the intuition that abduction makes use of perspectives. 6 The definition of updates must be modified 5 Let π = <i,Σ> be a perspective, we say that φ is true in π if φ is in Σ.
to take perspectives into account. We define the update of <i,Σ> with φ, <i,Σ> + φ in symbols, to be <i,Σ + φ>. This proposal has three main features. First, it is consistent with the intuition that de ce fait and du coup are "more" causal than donc and alors and "less" causal than à cause de. Second, it does not require that we change in any essential wa the basic update mechanism; the only significant change concerns the rules, which receive types (not just labels) and can be exploited by DMs in various ways. As a result, for the DMs we considered, the sensitivity to discourse level is not directl coded in the lexical instructions of the lexical items, but rather emerges through the constraints they put on rule type and rule use. Third, our proposal leaves room for the difference between content and epistemic states, as in the (by now) traditional approach of discourse levels.
Speech acts and parce que
The problem
Examples like (18) suggest that parce que may connect speech acts to other discourse entities. The proposition that I have to fix the shelf is offered as a possible explanation/justification of the question.
18.
Tu peux me trouver le marteau ? Parce qu'il faut que je répare l'étagère Can you find the hammer? Because I have to fix the shelf In contrast, (19) is very strange, although the proposition that the speaker wants to spare the addressee some troubles can be viewed as a possible justification of the assertion (interpreted as a warning).
19.
Jean est très violent.
??
Parce que je ne veux pas que tu aies d'ennuis John is very violent. because I don't want you to get into trouble Knott (1996) proposes that, for structures X because , the belief that Y may be, for the addressee, a reason for doing φ, where φ is the goal of the speech act X (obeying a command, answering a question, etc.). It is not clear that this accounts for (19) . Believing that the speaker tries to protect the addressee might be a reason to take the warning into account. However, the spirit of Knott's proposal can be retained by introducing some modification. We propose that, in monologues, parce que is sensitive to the illocutionary goal (i.g.) or point of the primary act (for a direct speech act) or secondary act (for an indirect speech act). According to Searle (1969) , the i.g. of a representative act like the assertion John is very violent is to commit the speaker to the truth of the proposition expressed. (19) is strange because, for the addressee, believing that the speaker wants to protect her may not explain why the speaker would have to commit herself to the truth of John is very violent.
Note that it is important, in this respect, to distinguish between the i.g. and a parallel goal which is to inform the addressee that John is very violent. In general, i.g. do not count as assertions, that is, as updates. They constitute preconditions of the act, wh ich live in the background, like presuppositions. However, it was observed by Ducrot (1972) We propose that they are propositions in a special type of information state.
Updates associated with assertions modify the standard information state <Φ,Π>.
I.g.'s modify the information in an alternative type of information state, that we term Γ. For simplicity, we merge our two information states to obtain <Γ,Φ,Π>.
The semantic profile of DMs determines which kind of updated information the "see". Any assertive update has the following general properties ( M is supposed to be universal).
22.
Assertive updates
An The consequence DMs reviewed in section 2 "see" onl Φ for assertive updates.
23. Condition (11) applies only to Φ for consequences DMs and assertive updates.
In contrast, parce que can "see" Φ or Γ. In a monologue, it is appropriate only if it indicates the cause of a proposition introduced in Φ or Γ. There are important differences between these two cases, as shown in (Groupe λ-1 1975) . When parce que exploits Φ, it behaves as a subordinating conjunction combining two sentences into a complex sentence. When it exploits Γ, it behaves semanticall like adverbial DMs and syntactically like a conjunction (it has a fixed position at the beginning of the sentence). 7 Semantically, that is, in terms of update, there is a parallel distinction. We assign to parce que the condition (24), which is the counterpart of (11).
Parce que
A discourse of form φ parce que ψ is appropriate in a monologue with respect to a set of rules R and an information state <Γ,Φ,Π> of a iff : Condition 1 corresponds to the assertion of a causal link between two ordinar propositions; when parce que is licensed via this condition is it analogous to à cause de. Condition 2 is based on Γ. It applies to (18), for instance. If the rules R we can access entail that the fact that the speaker wa nts to know whether the 7 A similar well-known difference exists in English with because. See (Blakemore 1987) and (Rouchota 1998 ) for a presentation.
hearer can find the hammer (in other terms, the i.g. of the right sentence) can be caused by the fact that he wants to fix something (and needs the hammer), the corresponding update will trivially succeed. Note that, by definition (22), the only real updates concern φ, ψ and ig(φ). The other ones are virtual and check the deducibility of a causal relation. A more interesting case is the justification of modal judgments. Here, parce que is not a subordinating conjunction, since, for instance, no it-cleft transformation is possible. 2) allows the DM to "see" i.g.'s, a feature which is responsible for its "speech act" sensitivity.
Conclusion
The proposed analysis reconstruct s the discourse level sensitivity of DMs as a sensitivity to information type. To this aim, we assume that DMs can select inference rules as well as arguments of updates (or, more generally, transitions), that is, different sets of propositions. Lack of sp ace preclude the discussion of many interesting points, which we intend to elaborate in subsequent work. Let us simply mention the status of the common ground (Stalnaker 1978) , or, more generally, the status of inference rules, the comparison of the rule/t ype combination used in our approach with the conceptual/procedural distinction familiar from relevance theory (Rouchota 1998) , and with the speaker involvement theory of Degand & Pander Maat (1999) , where the causal relations can depend on the speaker to various degrees.
